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Recent Japanese Policy in China 
T HE significance of Japan's new China policy, which was outlined by Baron 
Tanaka last July, several months after he 
succeeded Premier Wakatsuki as head of the 
Japanese Government, was not generally 
appreciated in the United States until a 
short time ago when China voiced a strong 
protest against certain Japanese demands 
with respect to Manchuria. The anti-Japan-
ese agitation which followed served to em-
phasize the apparent departure of the 
Tanaka government from the "Friendship 
Policy" pursued by its predecessors since 
the Washington Conference, at least so far 
as Manchuria and Mongolia are concerned. 
The new "Positive Policy" draws a sharp 
line between Manchuria and Mongolia and 
China proper; it reasserts Japan's special 
interests in the former area, and openly 
announces Japan's intention to defend these 
interests at all costs. 
The importance of Tanaka's policy may be 
gauged by a comparison with previous poli-
cies and a survey of the nature and extent of 
Japan's interests in Manchuria. 
In the period between 1895 and 1922, 
that is, from about the time of the Sino-
Japanese War until after the Washington 
Conference, Japanese policy seemed to be 
directed primarily toward securing a posi-
tion of influence in China. This policy, which 
at times was conducted with little or no re-
gard for the susceptibilities of the Chinese, 
was justified by Japanese on the ground of 
checking Russia's advances, which threat-
ened the peace of the Far East. The Treaty 
of Shimonoseki, terminating the war with 
China in 1895, gave to Japan the island of 
Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, the Liao-
tung Peninsula, and the right to hold Wei-
haiwei until China had carried out the 
provisions of the treaty. Although immedi-
ately forced by the European powers to sur-
render the Liaotung Peninsula Japan re-
gained control of Port Arthur and Dairen 
as a result of her successful war against 
Russia in 1905. In 1910 Japan annexed 
Korea. In 1915 she took advantage of 
European preoccupation with the World 
War to serve upon China the famous 
Twenty-One Demands which culminated in 
the treaties and agreements of May, 1915. 
JAPANESE POLICY IN CHINA 
Thus, following the example of the west-
ern powers in building powerful armies and 
navies and in protecting and extending na-
tional interests, if need be by force, Japan 
secured a dominant position of influence on 
the Asiatic mainland. At the time of the 
Washington Conference Japan had succeeded 
to the Russian rights in Manchuria and the 
German rights in Shantung, and, because of 
her close proximity to China, was probably 
in a stronger position than either Germany 
or Russia had been. J apancse troops also 
occupied the port of Vladivostok, and the 
northern part of Sakhalin. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES ACCEPTED 
AT WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 
Despite vigorous criticism from a number 
of influential Japanese newspapers, the Jap-
anese Government accepted President Hard-
ing's invitation to the Washington Confer-
ence in 1921. At the Conference Japan sub-
scribed to the naval treaty and the several 
agreements relating to China. Article 1 
of the treaty relating to principles and 
policies to be followed in matters concerning 
China laid down certain specific obligations 
which the signatory powers, including Japan, 
agreed to observe. It read as follows: 
ARTICLE I. The Contracting Powers, other 
than China, agree: 
(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independ-
ence, and the territorial and administrative in-
tegrity of China; 
(2) To provide the fullest and most unem-
barrassed opportunity to China to develop and 
maintain for herself an effective and stable 
government; 
(3) To use their influence for the purpose 
of effectually establishing and maintaining the 
principle of equal opportunity for the commerce 
and industry of all nations throughout the terri-
tory of China; 
(4) To refrain from taking advantage of con-
ditions in China in order to seek special rights 
or privileges which would abridge the rights of 
subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from 
countenancing action inimical to the security of 
such States. 
In carrying out these and other obliga-
tions, Japan introduced a new policy toward 
China, popularly known as the "Friendship 
Policy." 
EARLY RESULTS OF 
"FRIENDSHIP POLICY" 
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The effects of the "Friendship Policy" t 
ward China began to appear shortly after th 
Washington Conference. Within a year th 
Japanese Government withdrew its troop 
from Hankow and Shantung, although sti 
retaining them in Manchuria, and also with 
drew its post offices in all parts of China ex 
cept Manchuria. In the Washington treaty o 
February 4, 1922, Japan agreed to terminat 
the lease of Tsingtao, which Germany ha 
secured for ninety-nine years in 1898, and t 
hand over to China the Shantung railwa 
constructed by Germany. Ratification of th 
treaty by the two governments was affected 
in June, 1922. China was given fifteen years 
to pay for this road, the value of which was 
fixed by a joint commission at 40,000,000 
yen.* This settlement, according to Mr. John 
E. Baker, adviser to the Chinese Ministry 
of Communications, secures better terms for 
China than are to be found in any other 
railway contract negotiated under the Re-
public. 
In April, 1923, the Japanese and American 
Governments in an exchange of notes term-
inated the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of No-
vember 2, 1917, in which the United States 
had recognized Japan's "special interests in 
China, particularly in the part to which her 
possessions are contiguous." By 1924, Japan 
had settled most of her difficulties with Rus-
sia and had agreed to withdraw her troops 
from northern Sakhalin, in return for cer-
tain concessions. Following the example of 
the United States, the Japanese Government 
in March, 1923 turned over Japan's share 
of the Boxer indemnity, and also the pay-
ments which China must make on the Shan-
tung properties, to a special fund for Chinese 
educational and cultural work. 
The effort of the Japanese to regain 
China's good will was further demonstrated 
during the famous "May 30 Affair" of 1925, 
when foreign police opened fire on Chinese 
demonstrators in Shanghai who were pro-
testing the shooting of a Chinese laborer by 
Japanese cotton mill guards·. The affair led 
quickly to a general strike and serious anti-
foreign demonstrations throughout China. 
• A yen Is worth ar>Proxima tely 50 rents (Anlerlca.n). 
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Japan promptly took steps to appease the 
Chinese and quietly paid an indemnity to the 
family of the Chinese laborer who had been 
killed. As a result of this policy of settling 
the affair "out of court," the Japanese es-
caped the worst effects of the outburst of 
Chinese opinion which was subsequently 
directed against other foreigners. 
JAPAN AVOIDS INTERVENTION 
IN CHINA'S REVOLUTION 
Despite the fact that out of the 346,000 
foreigners in China approximately 235,000 
are Japanese and that Japanese trade in 1926 
predominated in China, the Japanese Govern-
ment has until recently followed a policy 
of "non-intervention" toward the Chinese 
revolution. During the Nanking incident 
of 1927, in which Japanese as well as other 
foreign property was destroyed, the Tokyo 
Government consistently opposed the idea of 
intervention. In this it was apparently sup-
ported by a majority of the Japanese press. 
When a similar incident occurred at Nan-
king in 1913 it led to a riot in Tokyo and 
a strong demand for action. Commenting on 
this change, a well-known Japanese writer, 
Yusuke Tsurumi, states, "But when the 
trouble occurred in Nanking this year there 
was no ripple on the surface of Tokyo's 
political waters and no public protest over 
non-intervention. How account for this 
change? It was because in the first place the 
psychology of the people had changed. In 
the second place, there was a strong sym-
pathy for the legitimate aspirations of the 
Chinese people embodied in the Nationalist 
movement. And in the third place the send-
ing of troops into a foreign country was dis-
liked by the people after the experience of 
the Siberian Expedition." 
The official attitude of the Japanese Gov-
ernment toward the situation in China was 
defined by Baron Shidehara, the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, in an address to the Diet 
in January, 1927, in the course of which he 
said: 
"Japan's policy covering all questions 
of relations between Japan and China may 
be summarized: 
"First-Respect the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of China and scrupu-
lously avoid all interference in her domes-
tic strife. 
227 
"Second-Promote the solidarity and 
economic rapp1·ochement between the two 
nations. 
"Third-Entertain sympathetically and 
helpfully the just aspirations of the Chi-
nese people and cooperate in efforts of 
realization of such aspirations. 
"Fourth-Maintain an attitude of pa-
tience and cooperation in the present situa-
tion in China and at the same time protect 
Japan's legitimate and essential rights and 
interests by all reasonable means at the 
disposal of the Government." 
Baron Shidehara's policy apparently made 
no distinction between Manchuria and the 
rest of China; and while professing the pol-
icy of strict non-intervention in Chinese 
affairs, it reserved the right of protecting 
Japanese lives and property when immedi-
ately endangered. At the time this policy 
was announced, however, the civil war in 
China was confined largely to the South, 
where Japanese interests were less impor-
tant than in the North. 
BARON TANAKA CRITIC 
OF "FRIENDSHIP POLICY" 
The "Friendship Policy" of the Wakatsuki 
cabinet was severely criticized in April, 1927 
by Baron Tanaka, then the leader of the 
opposition party, the Seiyukai. Baron 
Tanaka, a member of the Choshu Clan, was 
formerly a general in the Japanese Army, 
a Vice-Chief of the General Staff and Min-
ister of War in three recent Cabinets. He 
became head of the Seiyukai party in 1925. 
In the course of his address he said: 
"Disturbances in China have gone from bad to 
worse and the conditions there threaten to pene-
trate into the zone where Japan has vested in-
terests ... The national flag of Japan has been 
trampled upon, and Japanese residents have met 
the utmost humiliation. I do not understand the 
indifferent attitude the authorities take toward 
this. 
"In the face of this fact the authorities con-
tinue to advocate policies of non-intervention ... 
The disturbances in China have gone beyond the 
limit of mere domestic disputes, they endanger 
the Far East, and threaten to affect the peace 
of the world ... Japan should take the initiative, 
if necessary, in taking an effective step in co-
operation with the Powers. We believe this will 
be inevitable."* 
•Japan Atlt•ertlser, April 17, 19~7. 
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NEW TAN AKA GOVERNMENT 
OUTLINES POLICY TOWARD CHINA 
A few days later the Wakatsuki cabinet 
went out of office and Baron Tanaka was 
asked to form a new Government. In an-
nouncing the formation of a cabinet, in which 
he served in the double capacity of Premier 
and Foreign Minister, he declared; 
"We have long entertained profound sympathy 
with the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese 
people and are determined to help them to attain 
their end, taking into consideration the situation 
at home and abroad. But I consider that such 
aspirations could be attained in due order and by 
appropriate means ... Moreover, I think that if the 
legitimate aspirations of the Chinese people are 
fulfilled, they will have no wish to endanger the 
present relations between China and the Powers. 
... In the matter of Communist activity in China, 
Japan can hardly remain indifferent ... This ac-
tivity is a matter of extreme importance from the 
viewpoint of the peace of the world and the 
happiness of mankind in general, and Japan is 
ready to cooperate with the Powers, after taking 
into consideration the character of the particular 
problems involved, the appropriate time, and the 
proposed measures to be taken. . ."* 
This announcement called forth the warn-
ings of the Tokyo Asahi, the Osaka Asahi, 
the Jiji Shimpo, the Tokyo Nichinichi, and 
the Osaka Mainichi, all of whom warned the 
government against a positive policy toward 
China. The Tokyo Asahi declared: 
"No one can foretell the future of China; never-
theless it is advisable to let the Chinese them-
selves settle their own internal affairs. • . As 
every word and action of Premier Tanaka is being 
closely watched by the Chinese, we hope the 
present administration will be extremely cautious 
in executing its policy toward China." 
The Jiji Shimpo said: 
"We sincerely hope that the new administra-
tion will not adopt any radical change in its 
policy toward China, neither resort to any rigid 
policy, as that is not the real purpose of the 
administration, we are sure." 
Before the end of the month the new Tan-
aka government was confronted with an 
issue which called for prompt decision. Dur-
ing the spring the Chinese Nationalist army, 
under General Chiang Kai-shek, had been 
moving northward from Nanking, and in 
May it entered Shantung, where Japanese 
interests are far more extensive than in the 
South. Tokyo acted without delay and dis-
patched a force of about 2,000 men to Tsing-
tao, later sending 2,000 more inland to 
•Ja11an. Advertiser .. April 22, 1927. 
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Tsinan and points in between. Simultan-
eously the Tanaka government denied any 
intention to interfere with the military oper-
ations of the northern or southern troops 
and declared the measure was taken only for 
the protection of Japanese nationals in the 
area of hostilities. The statement concluded: 
"The Japanese Government, therefore, de-
clare that although they dispatched troops 
as an unavoidable measure of self-defence, 
they have no intention whatever of keeping 
them for a prolonged period and the troops 
will be wholly withdrawn immediately the 
fear of danger to her residents in that region 
ceases to exist." 
Both the Peking Government and the 
Nationalists vigorously protested to Japan 
and demanded the immediate evacuation of 
the troops. The official news agency of the 
Nanking Moderate Nationalists, moreover, 
stated that the Japanese troops interfered 
with the advance of the southern forces 
through occupation of the entire railway 
zone from Tsingtao to Tsinan. The occupa-
tion quickly led to a southern boycott on 
Japanese goods. 
JAPANESE PRESS CRITICAL OF 
1927 SHANTUNG EXPEDITION 
Criticism was also voiced in Japan and a 
number of newspapers attacked the policy 
of the Tanaka govenment. The Tokyo 
Nichinichi, for example, declared that there 
was no "need to protect our residents in 
Tsinan. On the other hand, there is no doubt 
that we have lost much by the misunder-
standing we have aroused." The Jiji stated 
that "if the unsettled conditions of Tsinan 
continue the Government should withdraw 
both residents and troops." 
Whether or not as a result of the Japanese 
occupation, the Nationalist advance through 
Shantung soon collapsed. On August 30, 
1927, the Japanese Government ordered the 
withdrawal of the inland forces on the 
ground that the failure of the Nationalist 
campaign had removed the risk of disorder 
in Shantung. But in a statement issued at 
the time of withdrawal, the Japanese Gov-
ernment issued a warning that "in case peace 
and order are disturbed in future, not only 
in Shantung, but in any part of China where 
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Japanese reside, and it is feared that their 
safety may be affected, the Japanese Govern-
ment may be constrained to take such self-
defensive steps as circumstances require." 
TAN AKA PROPOSES SEPARATE 
POLICY FOR MANCHURIA 
Meanwhile Baron Tanaka called an 
Oriental Conference, which met in Tokyo in 
June, 1927, and was attended by the lead-
ing officials in the War and Navy Min-
istries, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Kwantung Army, the Governor of Kwan-
tung, the Minister to Peking, and the Con-
suls-general at Mukden and Shanghai. It 
was at the final session of this conference 
that Baron Tanaka announced that Japan-
ese policy must differ in respect to China 
proper and to Manchuria and Mongolia. 
While the references to China proper did 
not differ materially from previous state-
ments, Baron Tanaka emphasized the fact 
that Japan held a special position in Man-
churia and Mongolia, "in connection with 
her national defense, as well as for the ex-
istence of the nation." It is henceforth to 
be Japan's own responsibility "to keep the 
region fit for safe living of Chinese and for-
eigners by maintaining peace and order 
and developing economic conditions there-
in." As to the protection of Japan's special 
position in this area, the Government 
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"would carry out measures suitable to the 
occasion." Should disturbances arise en-
dangering Japan's special interests, "Japan 
will take steps to protect them, no matter 
from what direction the menace comes."* 
At the Gubernatorial Conference, on 
June 27, Tanaka declared that Japan was 
"resolved to carry out, either independent-
ly or in concert with other powers, a policy 
which it deems necessary for the main-
tenance of peace in the Far East." Some 
Japanese papers interpreted these various 
statements to mean that the new govern-
ment had jettisoned Baron Shidehara's 
"friendship" policy in favor of the "posi-
tive" policy, the exact nature of which was 
not known, but which would take a more 
stern attitude toward China. 
The new government of Japan, it would 
appear, will not intervene in China's do-
mestic quarrels outside of Manchuria and 
Mongolia unless these quarrels threaten 
to injure Japanese interests. But as the 
intervention in Shantung shows, the Tana-
ka government will be much more ready 
to intervene to protect these interests than 
was the Shidehara government. 
The Tanaka government, however, will 
apparently not tolerate any disturbance 
arising out of civil war in Manchuria be-
cause of Japan's "special interests" in this 
part of China. The nature of these in-
terests will now be discussed. 
JAPANESE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA 
Manchuria, comprising the Three Eastern 
Provinces of China, has an area of 365,000 
square miles, which is nearly as large as the 
states of Washington, Oregon, California 
and Utah combined. While an accurate 
census has never been taken, it is estimated 
that Manchuria has a population of about 
25,000,000 Chinese and Manchus, together 
with about 600,000 Koreans, 100,000 Rus-
sians, and 190,000 Japanese. 
Although Manchuria is a part of China, 
Japan and Russia have bitterly contended 
over this territory and are vitally concerned 
in its future. A correspondent has recently 
stated, "Manchuria is the danger spot of 
Eastern Asia and is also one of Eastern 
Asia's greatest promises. It is a land which 
three nations want and which three nations 
are struggling either to possess or to control. 
To China, Manchuria means a buffer state 
against either Russia or Japan, a source of 
income, a relief for over-population, and a 
tremendous amount of what is so dear to 
the Chinese--'face.' To Japan, Manchuria 
means the promise of raw materials for 
Japanese mills and factories and a market 
for Japan-made goods, a source of income 
in other ways and the front line of defense 
against military aggression from the Asiatic 
continent. To Russia, Manchuria is the link 
connecting Moscow with Vladivostok, the 
possible route to an ice-free port in the East, 
a source of income and, at present, a chan-
•see Annex I for text of Tanaka Statement. 
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nel for the propagation of Communist doc-
trine in China and Japan."* 
RUSSIA AND JAPAN COMPETE 
FOR CONTROL OF MANCHURIA 
This struggle for control of Manchuria be-
gan in the final years of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Resentment was aroused in Japan 
when Russia, supported by France and Ger-
many, forced the Japanese Government to 
surrender the Liaotung Peninsula won from 
China in 1895. It was heightened in 1897 
and 1898 when the European powers freely 
appropriated for themselves strategic points 
in China. Particular apprehension was 
created by Russia's apparent designs in Man-
churia. In 1898 Russia forced China to 
grant her a twenty-five year lease on the 
harbors of Port Arthur and Dairen, in 
which, according to the treaty of March 29, 
Russia was given "the supreme civil ad-
ministration." 
Two years earlier the Russian Govern-
ment had become actively interested in the 
construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, 
which offered the advantage of a direct 
route across Manchuria from Chita, a point 
on the main line of the Trans-Siberian Rail-
way, to Vladivostok at the eastern end of 
the system. In 1896, the Chinese Govern-
ment granted the Russo-Chinese Bank, which 
had been chartered by the Russian Govern-
ment the year before, a concession to build 
the road across Chinese territory. A Rus-
sian company was formed actually to build 
and operate the road. Under the terms of 
the contract between the bank and the 
Chinese Government the company was given 
the right to acquire not only land necessary 
for the construction of the line, but also 
lands in the vicinity of the line for providing 
sandstone, lime and other materials. Fur-
ther provisions gave the company "the abso-
lute and exclusive right of administration 
of these lands" and the right to erect build-
ings of all sorts. Although China agreed to 
be responsible for the protection of the rail-
way and its employees, the company assumed 
the right to employ its own police for the 
maintenance of order within the railway 
•F. H. Hedges, "l1a.nchurln. an Empire," T J'ans·Paciftc., Janu-
ary 16, 1927. 
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zone. The contract further provided that 
after eighty years from its completion the 
railway should revert to China without pay-
ment; after thirty-six years China would 
have the option of buying the railroad upon 
payment in full of capital, debts and interest. 
As the line was completed in 1903, this op-
tion would fall due in 1939. * 
Fearing that Russia was about to seize 
political control not only of Manchuria but 
also of the independent state of Korea, thus 
threatening Japanese security, Japan em-
barked on the war of 1904-5 with Russia 
which resulted in a Japanese victory. In the 
Portsmouth Treaty, signed September 5, 
1905, the Russian Government, with the con-
sent of China, transferred to Japan (1) the 
lease of Port Arthur and Dairen, and (2) 
that part of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
extending between Chang-chun and Port 
Arthur, which is now called the South Man-
churia Railway. 
The treaty also recognized Japan's para-
mount interests in Korea, which Japan fin-
ally annexed in 1910, and ceded to Japan the 
southern part of the Russian island of Sak-
halin, off the eastern coast of Siberia. 
An additional article of the treaty pro-
vided that Russia and Japan had the right 
to maintain guards to protect their respec-
tive railway lines in Manchuria. The num-
ber of such guards was not to exceed fifteen 
per kilometer and was to be fixed by agree-
ment between Russia and Japan. 
On December 22, 1905, China and Japan 
concluded a treaty in which China agreed 
to the transfer of the above Russian inter-
ests to Japan. In an additional agreement, 
Japan agreed to withdraw her guards along 
the railway simultaneously with the with-
drawal of Russian guards. While Chang 
Tso-lin obliged the Russian guards to with-
draw several years ago, the Japanese guards 
remain to the present time. In an alleged 
secret protocol to the 1905 treaty, China is 
stated to have promised not to construct any 
main line in the neighborhood and parallel 
to the South Manchuria Railway or any 
branch line which might be prejudicial to 
the railway. 
•see "Th e Ch inese Eastern R a tl wny," In/ ormation Bcrv-iccJ 
Yol. II, No. 1. a nd Mac M urray, mrreatiE'B a nd Agreementa 
with n nd Con cer ning C'h ina," p. 1222. 
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RAILWAY MAP OF MANCHURIA 
Japan's position in South Manchuria to-
day is based on the lease of Port Arthur and 
Dairen, called the Kwantung Leased Area, 
and control of the South Manchuria Railway. 
In the agreements of May, 1915, following 
the Twenty-One Demands, Japan secured an 
extension of the lease of the Kwantung area 
to 1997 and of her rights in the South Man-
churia Railway to 2002, or a period of 99 
years. This agreement also abrogated China's 
right to recapture the South Manchuria 
Railway in 1939, and granted Japanese 
JAPANESE POLICY IN CHINA 
the right to trade and lease land for commer-
cial and agricultural purposes in South Man-
churia-a right which foreigners generally 
do not enjoy elsewhere in China. It was also 
agreed that Japanese could prospect and 
open mines in certain parts of South Man-
churia, and that if foreign advisers on 
political, financial, military, or police matters 
were to be employed in South Manchuria, 
Japanese should be employed first. If China 
required foreign capital to build railways in 
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon-
golia, she should negotiate with Japanese 
capitalists first. 
At the Washington Conference the Chinese 
delegation asked that the treaties of May 25, 
1915, be reconsidered and cancelled. The 
Japanese delegation replied that "if it should 
once be recognized that rights solemnly 
granted by treaty may be revoked at any 
time on the ground that they were conceded 
against the spontaneous w:m of the grantor, 
an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be 
established, with far-reaching consequences 
upon the stability of the existing interna-
tional relations in Asia, in Europe and else-
where." Nevertheless the Japanese delega-
tion agreed to throw open to the joint activity 
of the international financial consortium the 
right of option granted exclusively in favor 
of Japanese capital with regard to loans for 
the construction of railways in South Man-
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia. It fur-
ther stated that Japan had no intention of 
insisting on her preferential rights in regard 
to Japanese advisers in Manchuria. The 
Japanese Government also withdrew the 
right to negotiate in the future in regard to 
Group V of the Twenty-One Demands. 
Thus while the Japanese surrendered their 
rights in Shantung, they now declined to 
surrender their rights in the leased area or 
over the railway in Manchuria. On March 
10, 1923, the Chinese Government sent a note 
to Japan stating that the treaties of 1915 
were null and void, and that the expiration 
of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen, 
granted Russia in 1898 for 25 years, was 
near at hand. The Japanese Government 
declined to discuss the question and reas-
serted that the treaties remained in force. 
The Chinese Government, despite the leasing 
provisions in the 1915 treaty, has so far re-
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fused to grant such leases to Japanese in the 
interior of Manchuria on the ground that the 
treaty is invalid. 
By virtue of the rights which it inherited 
from Russia, Japan exercises jurisdiction 
over (1) 1,300 square miles in the leased 
territory of the Kwantung peninsula, (2) 
100 square miles in the South Manchuria 
Railway Zone. The Leased Territory is 
under the jurisdiction of a Japanese civil 
governor, who also exercises a certain 
authority over the Railway Zone. Within 
the Railway Zone the company has charge 
of a number of schools, laboratories, hos-
pitals and agricultural experimental stations. 
THE JAPAN ESE SOUTH 
MANCHURIA RAILWAY 
The most powerful enterprise in Man-
churia is the South Manchuria Railway, 
one-half of the stock of which is held by 
the Japanese Government which guarantees 
to this road an annual profit of 6 per cent 
on the paid-up capital for a period of fifteen 
years. Between 1907 and 1926 the annual 
tonnage transported increased from 1,486,-
434 tons to 16,253,250 tons, while receipts 
jumped from 9,768,887 yen to 106,491,-
136 yen. In 1924-1925 the railway showed 
a profit of more than 34,000,000 yen, and it 
has paid a dividend of 10 per cent for the 
last four years. It has assisted the Chinese 
Government, either through loans or by 
actual construction, in the building of three 
lines in Manchuria which act as feeders to 
the main South Manchuria line. The rails 
used in Manchuria construction are pur-
chased from the United States Steel Corpor-
ation. It is an interesting fact that over a 
third of China's railway mileage is found in 
Manchuria. The South Manchuria Company 
owns and operates 686 miles of railway in 
South Manchuria and it operates the 1,153 
miles of State railways in Korea. It carries 
on a large number of other activities, such 
as the operation of harbors, coal mines, steel, 
electric and gas works, and a chain of hotels. 
In 1925-1926 it expended 4,419,000 yen on 
hospitals and 2,445,580 yen on schools for 
the inhabitants of the Railway Zone. 
The South Manchuria Railway employs 
nearly 10,000 officials and 29,000 employees, 
or a total of nearly 39,000 of whom mor 
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than 16,000 are Chinese. In addition, it em-
ploys 13,000 day laborers. 
ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE 
OF MANCHURIA 
Largely as a result of the transportation 
facilities afforded by the South Manchuria 
Railway, South Manchuria exported 299,-
506,287 taels of products in 1926 and im-
ported 248,134,219 taels, or a total trade of 
547,640,506 taels.* Next to Shanghai, Dai-
ren is the most important port in China. 
The total trade of China in 1926 was near-
ly 1,988,000,000 taels. In other words, South 
Manchuria, a territory having only 4.5 per 
cent of the total population of China, has 
over 27 per cent of the trade. In 1926 about 
71 per cent of South Manchuria's trade was 
with Japan.t 
The trade of South Manchuria increased 
from 395,263,204 taels in 1923 to 434,790,403 
taels in 1924; in 1924 it decreased to 395,-
767,619 taels; but increased in 1925 and 
again in 1926. In the latter year, it stood 
at 547,640,506. The principal export of 
Manchuria is the soy bean which is used in 
a soup eaten by the majority of the Japanese 
three times a day. A bean cake, made from 
the soy bean, is used as a fertilizer for the 
rice fields of Japan. This product, coming 
chiefly from Manchuria, is regarded along 
with rice as a fundamental food in the diet 
of the Japanese people. 
Within the Kwantung Leased Area and the 
South Manchuria Railway Zone the Japanese 
have maintained an orderly and efficient ad-
ministration. Partly as the result of their 
efforts, the population of Dairen has in-
creased from 18,000 in 1906 to 201,774 in 
1926 of whom 123,146 are Chinese. It is 
estimated that while the Chinese population 
, in Manchuria has about doubled during the 
past twenty years, it has increased more 
than fourteen fold within the Railway Zone. 
Apparently the Chinese have taken up their 
residence in this Japanese zone because of 
the fact that, compared with other parts of 
China, more security prevails and greater 
opportunities for employment exist. 
'Trade Return oJ Nortl• China, 1926, Vol. I. Ma.nchtlrla., 
Research Office, Department of Welfare, Research a.nd Foreign 
omces, S. M. R. Co., June, 1927. p. 3. The export figure In-
dud~• re-exports. A tael ts worth about 76 centa (American). 
tThe coast trade Is not Included In the toto.! trade but the 
trade of Korea. Is Included with that ot Japan. ' 
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Industrial development in Manchuria has 
partly depended upon labor from other parts 
of China. It is estimated that about 30 per 
cent of the labor employed in Manchuria is 
"alien." Much of this has been seasonal in 
nature, between 300,000 and 400,000 labor-
ers coming to Manchuria from the over-
populated provinces of Shantung and Chihli 
at the harvest season. A growing number 
of these, however, are taking up their per-
manent residence in Manchuria partly be-
cause of disordered conditions at home. 
Moreover, the number of immigrants has 
rapidly increased-it has been predicted that 
a million Chinese would enter Manchuria 
in 1927.* 
SOVIET INFLUENCE IN 
THE FAR EAST 
In the first few years following the estab-
lishment of the Soviet Government in Mos-
cow, it seemed that Russia's power in the 
Orient, including Manchuria, was on the 
wane. Allied troops were landed in Siberia ; 
a Far Eastern Republic was erected on 
Siberian soil, and inter-allied control was 
established for a time over the Chinese East-
ern Railway. In 1919-20 the Soviet Govern-
ment informed China that it would surrender 
all of the special rights which Russia had 
enjoyed, in company with other powers, 
under the "unequal treaty" regime. But 
this spirit of renunciation was short-lived. 
While Russia did agree to surrender her 
former treaty rights in the treaty of May 
31, 1924, she insisted on retaining a large 
degree of control over the Chinese Eastern 
Railway, which traverses northern Man-
churia. Under the old regime, the road was 
governed by a Board of Directors of nine 
Russians and Chinese. But the 1924 treaty 
provided that the road should have a Rus-
sian manager and a Board of Directors half 
. ' Russian and half Chinese. As a result of 
this agreement Russia's control over this 
important railway was partially restored. 
As late as August, 1927, there were 15 000 
Russians and 6,000 Chinese employed or: the 
staff of the "C. E. R.".t 
Likewise, Russia attempted to extend her 
influence in Outer Mongolia-a territory ly-
•c. ·w. Young, "Chinese Labor Jl11gra.tlon to Manchuria," 
Chinese Bconmnic Jol'rnal., July, 1927. 
tManchuna Dailv News, August s, 1927. 
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ing west of Manchuria and bordering on the 
Siberian frontier, over which the Chinese 
have claimed sovereignty for 200 years. In 
1921, Soviet troops occupied Urga, a leading 
city in Outer Mongolia, and organized a Mon-
golian government in virtual independence 
of China proper. In the same year Russia 
and Mongolia signed a secret treaty which 
is supposed to have recognized Mongolia's 
independence. In the 1921! treaty, surrender-
ing her special rights in China, Russia rec-
ognized that Outer Mongolia "was an in-
tegral part of China." Despite this promise 
the Outer Mongolia government is organized 
on Soviet lines and is supported by Soviet 
subsidies. The China Year Book, 1926, states 
that Outer Mongolia is in fact no more than 
one of the autonomous provinces of the 
Soviet domain. 
RUSSIA ENCOUNTERS 
CHANG TSO-LIN 
In her efforts to extend her influence in 
Manchuria, Soviet Russia soon found a 
worthy opponent in the person of Chang 
Tso-lin, the war lord who has ruled Man-
churia since 1918 and who today dominates 
the Peking government. Chang steadfastly 
refused to acknowledge the settlement of 
Manchurian questions reached by the Pek-
ing and Moscow governments in the treaty 
of May, 1924, and forced Russia to nego-
tiate a separate agreement at Mukden 
in September. Apparently Russia is the only 
government which has signed a separate 
treaty with the Manchurian war lord. 
Despite this agreement, Chang has come into 
frequent conflict with the Russians. He has 
hampered their control of the Chinese East-
ern Railway and Chinese officials have taken 
over the administration of the City of Har-
bin, formerly governed by Russian authori-
ties. It is alleged that the Russians helped 
to finance the Kuo Sung-lin revolt against 
Chang in 1925. Their attitude toward 
Chang was illustrated during this revolt by 
the refusal of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
to transport reinforcements without receiv-
ing cash payment in advance. After over-
coming this obstacle by moving the troops 
over a newly constructed "feeder" line to the 
South Manchuria Railway, Chang retaliated 
by ordering the arrest of the Russian man-
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ager of the "C. E. R.". Following an ulti-
matum from the Russian Government, the 
manager was released. The Russians were 
also accused of backing Feng Yu-hsiang, the 
"Christian" general, in the hope that he 
would overthrow Chang Tso-lin. In this 
struggle over the Chinese Eastern Railway, 
Chang, it is agreed by most observers, is 
proving to be the winner. Department after 
department of the railway's activities has 
been taken away from Russia and placed 
under Chinese control, and even important 
Russian officials, it is understood, have come 
under Chang's influence. In August, 1927, 
the Chinese Eastern Railway, which had 
hitherto deposited its receipts with the Dal-
bank at Harbin, agreed to deposit half of 
these receipts, which for 1926 amounted to 
$8,000,000, with the Chinese bank. The Chi-
nese have also appropriated for their own 
use the fleet of river boats on the Sungari 
which belonged to the railway. Chang's 
attitude toward the Russians generally is 
demonstrated by his periodic execution of 
Communists and by his raid of the Soviet 
Embassy in Peking in April, 1927. 
RAILWAY RIVALRY BETWEEN 
RUSSIA AND JAPAN 
Rivalry has also existed between the Rus-
sians and the Japanese, particularly in re-
gard to the Chinese Eastern and the South 
Manchuria railways. Both lines had been 
built by the Russo-Asiatic Bank as a part 
of a single transport system, and both lines 
were broad gauge. Following the cession of 
the South Manchuria line to Japan, the Jap-
anese tore up the broad gauge track and 
laid a standard gauge. The object in this 
change was strategic; it was to prevent the 
South Manchuria Railway from being of 
military use to Russia in time of war against 
Japan. But the effect of this change was 
also to do away with the possibility of run-
ning through trains over both lines from 
inland points in Siberia to Dairen and Port 
Arthur. Despite this difference in gauge, 
many shippers have found it profitable to 
ship their goods from Harbin to Changchun 
and then trans-ship them to South Man-
churia Railway points. In fact, 60 per c~nt 
of the traffic of the latter railway comes from 
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alien lines; and 40 per cent of this amount 
comes from the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
When the Russians regained control of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway in 1924, a traffic 
war ensued between the two companies. But 
so disastrous did it prove to the mutual in-
terests of each, that a rate agreement was 
made to the effect that 55 per cent of the 
eastbound traffic of the Trans-Siberian Rail-
way should be diverted to Harbin toward 
the South Manchuria lines, while the re-
maining 45 per cent should continue over 
the Chinese Eastern Railway to Vladivostok. 
Despite this agreement considerable feel-
ing has been kindled between Russia and 
Japan by the construction of two branch 
lines in Manchuria which may vitally affect 
the Chinese Eastern from the economic and 
strategic standpoint. The first of these 
branches connects the city of Taonan with 
Tsitsihar, a town lying eighteen miles north 
of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Nominally 
the Taonan line is Chinese, but it has been 
constructed by the South Manchuria com-
pany at a cost of 12,000,000 yen. For a time 
the progress of the road was blocked by the 
protest of the Soviet Government that it in-
vaded Northern Manchuria, a sphere in 
which it claimed Russia had a preferential 
position. In reply, Japan stated that Russia 
had surrendered all special privileges in 
China and that Japan was entitled to build 
the road under the Open Door principle. 
The Tsitsihar extension is of strategic im-
portance inasmuch as it may enable the 
Japanese to cut off Russian access to the sea 
in time of war. It also drains the valuable 
produce center of Anta. 
In October, 1925, the South Manchuria 
Railway signed an agreement with the Chin-
ese Government providing for the construc-
tion of a second extension, from Kirin to 
Tonghua, a distance of 60 miles. The J ap-
anese Government apparently favors the ex-
tension of this line to Kainei, a town near 
the Korean border. Kainei is already linked 
by rail to the Korean seaport of Seishin. 
When this Kirin-Kainei link is completed, 
the Japanese will have established complete 
rail communication from Harbin to the sea, 
which will be two days shorter to Japan 
than by way of Dairen. It is understood, 
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however, that the South Manchuria Railway 
is opposed to the completion of the road to 
Kanei on the ground that it will divert traffic 
from Dairen. 
JAPANESE RELATIONS 
WITH CHANG TSO-LIN 
In so far as Chang Tso-lin has maintained 
order throughout Manchuria and has op-
posed the Russian advance, he has won the 
sympathy of Japan. But when he has been 
unable to maintain order in areas where 
Japanese interests are important, the Japan-
ese Government has not hesitated to inter-
vene. In December, 1925, General Kuo Sung-
lin staged a revolt in which he almost routed 
Chang who was obliged to retire within the 
walled city of Mukden. After some discus-
sion during which the Military Staff urged 
action, the Japanese cabinet suddenly de-
cided to rush troops from Korea to the Man-
churian garrison, then depleted to half its 
normal strength of 8,000 men. The Govern-
ment also announced on December 16, 1925, 
that it would not permit any fighting within 
a neutral zone extending six miles on each 
side of the railway. Morally strengthened 
by the increase of Japanese troops and the 
establishment of this neutral area, General 
Chang rallied his forces and defeated Kuo, 
who when captured was decapitated. Fol-
lowing this defeat, the Japanese Foreign 
Office issued a statement that "there is every 
reason to believe that conditions will soon 
be normal" and that there is "no further 
necessity for Japan's holding a six-mile zone 
of neutrality along the South Manchuria 
Railway, since there is no longer any oppo-
sition to Chang's authority and power to be 
expected." 
Sometime after his victory over Kuo, 
Chang is reported to have publicly thanked 
the Japanese for their assistance. A Jap-
anese writer, Dr. Washio, also wrote: 
"Whenever Japan sends troops to China 
they operate, deliberately or not, in favor 
of Chang Tso-lin, and Chinese civil war 
being more of a political campaign than a 
military engagement, the prestige of J ap-
anese troops exerts an influence out of pro-
portion to the number of troops that are 
actually sent .... At the time of Kuo Sung-
lin's revolt the presence of a couple of 
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thousand of Japanese soldiers made it pos-
sible, accidentally or not, to save the day 
for Chang Tso-lin ... The idea that Man-
churia has been solidly under Chang's 
domination is a fiction. Without the pres-
tige of the Japanese cooperation he would 
have been ousted long ago by internal 
rivals."* 
On the other hand, Baron Shidehara, 
then Japanese Foreign Minister, denied 
the statement that the Japanese had fa-
vored Chang. In an address to the Diet 
in January, 1926, he stated that: "We de-
plore these unfounded, undeserved accusa-
tions, and in denying them categorically, 
we are confident that history will be the 
final judge of our clear conscience . . . It 
is a well known fact that Japan possesses 
essential rights and interests, both cor-
poreal and incorporeal, in the region of 
Manchuria and Mongolia. Of such rights 
and interests, those that have taken a tang-
ible shape, and are liable to destruction by 
acts of wa1·, are now mainly to be found 
along the line of the South Manchuria Rail-
way. In order to protect them from de-
struction we have been constrained to make 
necessary provision, which, we believe, has 
duly accomplished its end. With regard 
to our rights and interests of an immaterial 
kind, they did not seem likely to be af-
fected by the war, and we are satisfied 
that they have in fact remained entirely 
unaffected. 
"No doubt, the complete tranquillity of 
the whole region of the Three Provinces, 
undisturbed by any scourge of war, is 
highly to be desired, in the interest of the 
native population as well as Japanese resi-
dents. It is, however, a responsibility that 
properly rests upon China. Assumption 
of that responsibility by Japan without just 
cause would be manifestly inconsistent 
with the fundamental conception of exist-
ing international relations, with the basic 
principles of the Washington treaties, and 
with repeated declarations of the Japanese 
Government."t 
This cautious statement did not, how-
ever, appeal to the Japanese residents in 
•"The Far Eastern Conference,'" Trans-Paeiftc_. July 9, 
1927, p. 6. 
tTran.s-Paciftc, January 30, 1926, p. 15. 
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Manchuria, dissatisfied with the existing 
economic conditions. The average annual 
rate of increase in the number of Japanese 
in Manchuria for the last three years has 
been only 3.2 per cent; and out of 125 
Japanese firms publishing accounts for the 
first half of 1927, 53 showed a loss, while 
only 37 declared a dividend.t 
JAPANESE COMPLAINTS 
AGAINST MILITARY RULE 
Merchants complained that, despite some 
increase in trade, profits were checked by 
the dead-weight of Chang's military ex-
penditure and by his progressive inflation 
of the local currency-the fengpiao. These 
conditions unsettled trade while Chang's 
requisitions further reduced the purchas-
ing power of the population. Many Japan-
ese firms have not, moreover, recovered 
from the financial slump experienced in 
1920. Their latest grievance has arisen 
out of the imposition of new taxes by 
Chang. The first of these taxes, called 
the shusho zei, was levied on Japanese 
traders in the Railway Zone in which 
Japanese jurisdiction prevails. This was a 
tax on goods upon which the Japanese had 
already paid a duty at the port of entry. 
Hitherto the Chinese had issued certificates 
for such goods, exempting them from fur-
ther payment at "Open Ports" inland. The 
Japanese claim that this is really a likin tax. 
While the Japanese have recently succeeded 
in getting some goods into Mukden without 
paying this tax, the Chinese through fear of 
punishment decline to buy any goods not 
having a stamp tax. Following the example 
of the Nanking government, Chang has also 
started to collect the taxes envisaged by the 
Washington Conference treaty, which were 
not to go into effect until after an agreement 
of the powers, which the Customs Confer-
ence in China failed to consummate. 
In June, 1927, the Dail·en Chamber of 
Commerce peti ~ioned the Tokyo government 
to establish a colonial department, stating 
that "Japan's colonial administration is at 
low ebb," and that the policies of Japan in 
Manchuria were "wanting in thoroughness 
tMancllurla Dail11 News, July 25, 1927. 
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and effectiveness." A mass meeting of Jap-
anese merchants in Mukden also protested 
against the "practical bankruptcy of the 
Mukden government" (under Chang Tso-
lin), which had "bled the Chinese white and 
paralyzed Sino-Japanese trade." 
RESULTS OF ORIENTAL 
CONFERENCE, JUNE, 1927 
The Oriental Conference, convened by 
Baron Tanaka, in June-July, 1927, care-
fully considered these complaints. In the 
absence of Baron Tanaka at the session of 
July 1, Mr. Mori, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated, ac-
cording to the Osaka Asahi, "In a sense 
Japan's economic development in that ter-
ritory [Manchuria] is now at a standstill 
and the main cause of this deplorable state 
of things may be sought in the lack of a 
fixed Manchuria and Mongolia policy. In-
asmuch as an unsettled political situation 
in Manchuria has been responsible in some 
measure for Japan's failure to pursue a 
settled policy unflinchingly in the past, it 
is desirable that efforts should be made to 
secure political stability in Manchuria. In 
other words Manchuria must be made secure 
from the political unrest which is almost 
chronic in China ... " At the end of the 
Conference, as already stated, Baron Ta-
naka declared that henceforth the Japan-
ese Government would follow a policy in 
Manchuria and Mongolia distinct from that 
in China proper and that it would not per-
mit revolution or disorder in the former 
territory to disturb Japan's interests. 
Evidence of this "positive policy" was 
soon given in the removal of the presi'dent 
of the South Manchuria Railway and the 
appointment of Mr. Yamamoto, secretary-
general of the Seiyukai party, who had been, 
according to the Osaka Asahi, a confirmed 
advocate of the "positive policy." Mr. Yama-
moto is reported to have expressed dissatis-
faction with the inclination of the Company 
"to attach more more importance to business 
profits than the Company's innate mission."* 
After referring to Japanese sacrifices in 
Manchuria, he is also quoted as saying,-
"The Railway Company has a more impor-
tant mission than a merely economic one." 
•TI•e M anchuria Daily Ncwa, July 20, 1927. 
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Following these statements it was reported 
that the government would confer certain 
police and taxing powers upon the South 
Manchuria Railway within the Railway 
Zone and that it would increase the powers 
of the president of the railway. 
In order to attract Japanese enterprises 
to Manchuria and to stabilize currency, the 
government is considering the establishment 
of a Central Bank, which would presumably 
be a joint Sino-Japanese affair. It is also 
considering the establishment of a Mon-
golia Development Company. 
JAPAN ESE DEMANDS WITH 
RESPECT TO MANCHURIA 
After the conclusion of the Oriental 
Conference, the Japanese Government de-
cided upon four demands which Mr. Yoshida, 
Consul-general at Mukden, conveyed to the 
Civil Governor of Fengtien province upon his 
return and which the Japanese Minister con-
veyed to the Government at Peking. These 
covered the following points: 
(1) That the Chinese Government 
should grant land leases to Japanese as 
provided in the treaty of 1915. 
(2) That construction of the two Chi-
ese railway lines, parallel to the South 
Manchuria line (Japanese) should be 
abandoned and that China should not 
construct any parallel line in the future. 
(3) That the Chinese authorities should 
quickly agree to the extension of the Kir-
in-Hoinyung line. 
(4) That Japan should be permitted to 
open a new consulate immediately at Lin-
kiang, a town near the Korean border 
where many Korean malcontents reside. 
One of the two Chinese railways men-
tioned in (2) above extends from Takushan 
on the Peking-Mukden railway to Payintala, 
paralleling the main South Manchurian 
route. Another line, a hundred miles of 
which is already constructed, parallels the 
South Manchuria betweeP. Kirin and Hailung-
cheng. Invoking the alleged secret protocol 
of 1905, the Japanese Government has re-
peatedly protested to the Chinese Govern-
ment that the construction of these roads is 
illegal. But the Chinese Government has 
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nevertheless proceeded with the construction, 
which is being carried on by Chinese funds 
and Chinese engineers. Whether or not 
these roads will be administered with enough 
efficiency to compete with the South Man-
churia Railway remains to be seen. The 
Chinese motive in constructing these lines 
seems to be partly economic and partly 
political. Doubtless they believe that the 
establishment of roads, entirely free from 
Japanese control, would strengthen Chinese 
authority over Manchuria. By means of 
these roads, which will link the provincial 
capitals of Mukden, Kirin and Tsitsihar, 
Chang Tso-lin will be able to transport 
troops without regard to the wishes of the 
Russians or Japanese. 
Railway building, it appears, has also 
proved profitable to the Chinese generals. It 
is stated that the officials buy up in advance 
the land which the railway will traverse, 
and then lay the road bed a mile or two 
from the edge of the towns which it is 
designed to serve. When the railway is con-
structed the intervening land, now held by 
officials, greatly increases in value. 
ANTI-JAPAN ESE 
AGITATION 
When news of the Oriental Conference 
and of the rumored measures which the 
Japanese cabinet had decided to take in 
Manchuria reached China, feeling was 
aroused. Resenting the protests against the 
imposition of taxes and the construction of 
the branch railways, Chinese mobs in Muk-
den staged anti-Japanese demonstrations in 
August and September, 1927. The General 
Guild of Mukden, an association of local 
Chinese merchants somewhat similar to our 
Chambers of Commerce, served notice on all 
Chinese houses to buy no Japanese goods. 
Some Japanese insisted that the riots and 
other demonstrations were instigated by 
Chinese authorities, that Chinese officials 
took part in the anti-Japanese demonstration 
meetings, and that Chinese policemen went 
from door to door telling the people to dis-
play anti-Japanese banners and to march in 
anti-Japanese processions. It seems that the 
situation in Mukden is still serious and that 
anti-Japanese feeling among the people who 
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have been affected by the nationalist doc-
trines from the south is growing. 
It is understood that Chang is irritated be-
cause the Japanese Government, in compli-
ance with an international understanding of 
1919, has placed an embargo on the export 
of arms. 
Rumors have been frequent during the past 
few months that the Japanese Government, 
out of patience with Chang Tso-lin's dup-
licity, is attempting to bring about an under-
standing with the Nationalists in the south. 
Dr. C. C. Wu, the Foreign Minister of the 
Nanking government, expressing sympathy 
with Japan's position, recently declared that 
"the immediate return of the South Man-
churia Railway and the Kwantung conces-
sion is impossible in reality and these ques-
tions must find their solution in the fixing 
of a definite time for Japan to return them." 
He added, "We understand Japan's situa-
tion: that she is in great need of raw ma-
terials and an outlet for her population, and 
in this connection we intend to conform to 
Japan's proposals." In some quarters this 
statement has been interpreted to mean that 
Nanking would bow to Japan's aspirations 
in Manchuria in return for Japanese aid in 
establishing Nationalist control throughout 
the whole of China proper. 
SINO-JAPAN ESE ACCORD 
NOT IN SIGHT 
So far there have been no indications of 
an agreement between any Chinese faction 
and Japan in regard to Manchuria. Japan-
ese opinion seems to be unanimous that 
Japan shall not surrender her railway and 
leasehold interests and the Tanaka govern-
ment seems pledged to a "positive policy" 
which will increase Japanese control. Com- · 
menting on the Tanaka policy, the Osaka 
Asahi says, "As the general outlines of the 
new Manchuria and Mongolia policy clearly 
show, the present Cabinet is more positive 
about Japan's special position in Manchuria 
and Mongolia than any other Ministry in the 
past. It is doubtful whether the Okuma 
Cabinet had so confirmed a view about 
Japan's position when it formulated the fam-
ous Twenty-One Demands of 1915." Whether 
or not the Tanaka government intends to go 
further than to insist on the rights granted 
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in the agreements of May, 1915, (the validity 
of \vhich the Chinese refuse to recognize) re-
mains to be seen. Nevertheless the mere 
announcement of the "positive policy" al-
ready seems to have stimulated anti-Japan-
ese feeling throughout Manchuria. Hitherto 
the Japanese have taken the position that 
in view of the lower standard of living of 
the Chinese and the unwillingness of the 
Japanese to live in Manchuria, on account 
of its climate, the territory can be developed 
only by Chinese, working in cooperation with 
the Japanese. The Japanese Government 
must decide whether or not this principle, 
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the application of which depends upon 
Chinese goodwill, can be reconciled with the 
"positive policy." It must decide whether, 
especially in view of the critical financial and 
economic situation of Japan which has re~ 
suited from the recent earthquake and finan-
cial crisis, it will be able to impose a "positive 
policy" upon Manchuria, which is a portion 
of China, a country in which nationalist 
sentiment has recently become strong. While 
no one may predict the future, it seems that 
the question whether Manchuria will become 
independent of China will be a critical one 
during the next ten years. 
STATEMENT OF PREMIER TAN AKA AT THE ORIENTAL 
CONFERENCE, JULY 7, 1927 
The maintenance of peace in the Far East and 
the realization of the common prosperity of Japan 
and China form the basic principle of Japanese 
policy towards China. The methods of carrying 
out the principle, however, may vary in its applica-
tion to China proper and to Manchuria and Mon-
golia, in view of our special position in the Far East. 
The general outline of our policy towards China, 
which is based on this fundamental principle, may 
be summed up as follows: 
1. Although the stabilization of the political 
situation and the restoration of peace and order in 
China constitute the crying need of the times, yet 
the best way to realize them is to let the Chinese 
people themselves undertake it. Therefore, in the 
present internal political conflict in that country, 
we should not take the side of any party or clique 
and should respect the popular will and strictly 
avoid such steps as might interfere with the con-
tending forces. 
2. We are heartily in sympathy with the legiti-
mate national aspirations that emanate from the 
moderate elements in China, and we should always 
be ready to cooperate with them for their rational 
and gradual attainment through cooperation with 
the Powers as far as possible. 
At the same time, the peaceful economic develop-
ment of China is a matter ardently desired equally 
by the Chinese and the foreign peoples and its ac-
complishment demands the friendly cooperation of 
the Powers as well as the endeavors of the Chinese 
people themselves. 
3. The aforementioned objects can be accom-
plished only when a stable central government is 
established, but, when we view the present political 
situation in China, we find that the establishment 
of such a government is no easy matter. In the 
existing circumstances, therefore, we have no alter-
native but to keep ourselves properly in touch with 
moderate political factors in various places for the 
time being and to await the development of events 
for the gradual unification of the country. 
4. If, with the transition of the political situa-
tion, the governments of the North and South are 
combined or a federation of local political groups 
is formed, it is a matter of course that the attitude 
of the Japanese Government towards such different 
political factors will be entirely unchanged. If, 
under such conditions, a tendency at·ises toward the 
establishment of a unified government to deal with 
the foreign relations of China, we shall welcome it, 
as also will the Powers and stand ready to assist 
in the growth of such a government. 
5. It is irrefutable that the radical and destruc-
tive elements, taking advantage of the political un-
rest in China, may become rampant and disturb the 
public peace, thereby causing unfortunate interna-
tional embroglios. The Japanese Government ex-
pects that the suppression of obnoxious elements 
and the maintenance of peace and order will be 
effected through the control of the Chinese authori-
ties and the efforts of the Chinese people them-
selves; but, in the case of infringement of our 
legitimate rights and interests and the lives and 
property of our nationals, there will be no alterna-
tive for us but resolutely to take self-defensive 
measures and protect them, if necessary. Particu-
larly, it is necessary to dispel the misapprehensions 
and misunderstandings of those who, on the strength 
of unfounded rumors concerning Sino-Japanese re-
lations, blindly start a movement to boycott Japanese 
goods and, to take appropriate measures for safe-
guarding our rights. 
6. Since Manchuria and Mongolia, particularly 
The Three Eastern Provinces, have an important 
bearing upon the national defence and existence of 
this country, we must devote especial attention to 
those regions. We feel, moreover, particular re-
sponsibility as a neighbor for making them suitable 
for the residence of both Japanese and foreigners 
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by the preservation of peace and their economic 
development. 
The stimulus of the economic activities of Japan-
ese and foreigners alike in both the southern and 
northern parts of Manchuria and Mongolia, based 
upon the principles of the Open Door and equal 
opportunity, we hold to be instrumental in acceler-
ating the peaceful development of those regions and 
we should act in accordance with this principle in 
safeguarding our already acquired rights and inter-
ests and in solving pending questions. 
7. I believe that it will be best to leave stabiliza-
tion of the political situation in the Three Eastern 
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Provinces in their own hands. Any plan which 
will respect our special position in Manchuria and 
Mongolia and devise measures for stabilizing the 
political situation there will receive the due assist-
ance of the Japanese Government. 
8. If the disturbances spread to Manchuria and 
Mongolia, and as a result, peace and order are dis-
rupted, thereby menacing our special position and 
rights and interests in those regions, we must be 
determined to defend them, no matter whence the 
menace comes, and take proper steps without loss 
of time in order to preserve the regions as lands 
for peaceful habitation and development equally to 
Japanese and foreigners. 
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